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Scrutinizing Confessions in a New
Era of Juvenile Jurisprudence
Joshua A. Tepfer, Laura H. Nirider, & Steven A. Drizin

T

he landmark trilogy of United States Supreme Court juvenile sentencing decisions over the last decade is well
known. Starting with the Roper v. Simmons1 ruling in 2005
that abolished the death penalty for offenders under the age of
18, the Court has developed what might be called a “kids are
different” Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. The last three
years has seen the Court first outlaw life without parole sentences for juvenile non-homicide offenders2 and then prohibit
the mandatory imposition of this sentence on any offender
under the age of 18.3
During this same time period, and utilizing a similar rationale, the high Court applied this “kids are different” approach
to its Fifth Amendment jurisprudence in the constitutional
consideration of custodial interrogations. In J.D.B. v. North
Carolina,4 the U.S. Supreme Court held that law enforcement
must consider a suspect’s age when weighing whether he is in
custody and entitled to Miranda warnings.5 The decision
marked a reversal of sorts, as only seven years earlier the Court
had rejected the proposition that clearly established U.S.
Supreme Court law required a consideration of age in the
Miranda custody calculus.6 In J.D.B., however, the Court saw
no need to “blind [itself] to the commonsense reality” that
children “will often feel bound to submit to police questioning.”7 It so held, in part, based on a concern about the “frighteningly high percentage of people” who confess to crimes that
“they never committed” as a result of the “inherently compelling pressures” of custodial interrogation—a problem “all
the more troubling” and “acute,” the Court warned, when the
subject is a juvenile.8 Even the four dissenting justices did “not
dispute that many suspects who are under 18 will be more susceptible to police pressure than the average adult.”9
Scholars have remarked that the J.D.B. decision represents a
reinvigoration of the high Court’s jurisprudence of half a cen-

tury ago that required special protections for youth in the
interrogation room.10 Indeed, long-ago U.S. Supreme Court
decisions like Haley v. Ohio,11 Gallegos v. Colorado,12 and In re
Gault13 explicitly recognized the differences between youth
and adults in this context. While these cases are from another
era, J.D.B. has given renewed meaning to several oft-repeated
quotations from them, including: “[W]e cannot believe that a
lad of tender years is a match for the police [during custodial
interrogations],”14 and “[A]uthoritative opinion has cast formidable doubt upon the reliability and trustworthiness of ‘confessions’ by children.”15
In light of J.D.B. and the revitalization of a “kids are different” approach to custodial interrogations, this article highlights and examines issues that judges should carefully scrutinize when faced with a juvenile confession given as a result of
police questioning. These considerations include Mirandarelated issues, the confession’s voluntariness under a dueprocess analysis, and the heightened risk of unreliable or false
confessions from youth.

This article, tailored for a judicial audience, is taken from one published in the March 2014 issue of The Champion magazine, a publication of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.

1214.” J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2405. After J.D.B., of course, the failure of a court to make this consideration would be clear error.
7. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2398.
8. Id. at 2401 (quoting Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 321
(2009) (“frighteningly high percentage”) and Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966) (“inherently compelling pressures”)).
9. Id. at 2413 (Alito, J., dissenting).
10. See, e.g., Martin Guggenheim & Randy Hertz, J.D.B. and the
Maturing of Juvenile Confession Suppression Law, 38 WASH. U. J. L.
& POL’Y 109 (2012).
11. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
12. Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
13. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
14. Haley, 332 U.S. at 599–600.
15. Gault, 387 U.S. at 52.
16. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).

Footnotes
1. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
2. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
3. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
4. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011).
5. Id. at 2399–40, 2408.
6. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652 (2004). The majority in
J.D.B. explained that its decision was not constrained by the
Alvarado decision, in that Alvarado simply held that failing to consider age in the analysis was not “objectively unreasonable under
the deferential standard of review set forth by the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 110 Stat.
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POLICE INTERROGATIONS, FALSE CONFESSIONS, AND
THE NEW JUVENILE JURISPRUDENCE

Before considering the particular issues faced by judges in
cases in which juveniles are interrogated, a brief synopsis of
some of the common, modern-day tactics used during custodial interrogations is appropriate. Almost five decades ago, in
Miranda v. Arizona itself, the U.S. Supreme Court explained
that police interrogations entail “inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist
and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do
so freely.”16 To elucidate the “heavy toll” of custodial interrogation, the Court cited several police interrogation training
manuals, including Fred E. Inbau and John E. Reid’s Criminal

Interrogation and Confessions.17 Now in its fifth edition, Criminal Interrogation and Confessions promotes the Reid Technique—which to this day markets itself as “the most widely
used approach to question subjects in the world.”18
The Reid Technique teaches a nine-step interrogation
method that is used to extract confessions—a process that it
cautions should only be used when the police are confident the
suspect is responsible for the crime being investigated.19 At the
outset, interrogators are taught to isolate the suspect from family or support. The interview then begins with a rapport-building period, during which investigators will often allow the suspect to provide a narrative of his activities on the day of the
crime. After a short break, the investigator is trained to re-enter
the interrogation room and directly accuse the suspect of the
crime. During this period, the officer is taught to assert unwavering confidence in the suspect’s guilt and discount any
claims of innocence asserted.20 The goal of this portion of the
interrogation is to make the suspect feel hopelessly trapped.
When this is accomplished, confession is offered as a “carrot”
to the suspect—in other words, as a way out of the suspect’s
predicament. Through a process scholars call minimization,
interrogators indicate that the benefits of confessing outweigh
the costs of maintaining innocence.21 They may ask a murder
suspect, for example, whether the murder was the unplanned
result of a moment of anger or an “accident”—which are, they
intimate, different from a premeditated murder (although it’s
never said how the two differ). Ultimately, if an interrogator
successfully obtains an admission of responsibility from the
suspect, he is taught to elicit a narrative and detailed version of
the criminal act.22
While no doubt effective in eliciting true confessions, the
U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that these interrogation
tactics can be so psychologically powerful as to elicit false confessions at a “frighteningly” high rate.23 The false confession
first stems from law enforcement’s mischaracterization of an
innocent person as guilty and its decision to use these power-

ful tactics on that factually inno“[I]nterrogation
cent person.24 The “inherently
compelling pressures” described tactics can be so
above can then convince even an
psychologically
innocent person to admit responpowerful as
sibility.25 Ultimately, the resulting
to elicit false
false confession can often sound
convincing and detailed, particuconfessions
larly if crime scene facts are made
at a
known to the suspect through
‘frighteningly’
media reports, local gossip, or,
high rate.”
most often, the inadvertent, suggestive questioning of the interrogator.26 From national reports like CBS’s 60 Minutes27 to
countless local newspaper articles, stories of false confessions—and resulting wrongful convictions—have become
ubiquitous in the news cycle.
Interrogators employ these and [other] psychologically
coercive tactics on even the youngest of suspects. While officers may generally recognize that juveniles are more vulnerable or suggestible,28 in practice, many officers simply do not
alter their methods when interrogating a young suspect.29
Concrete examples abound. In the last few months alone, Tennessee law enforcement officers were caught on tape threatening several teenage suspects with the death penalty—or a lifetime of prison rape—during interrogations.30 The appropriateness of these tactics is highly debatable for any suspect, but it
is particularly difficult to stomach their use when the person
being questioned is only a teenager.
Due to juveniles’ “vulnerab[ility] or susceptib[ility] to . . .
outside pressures,”31 their “difficulty in weighing long-term
consequences,”32 and their “limited understandings of the
criminal justice system and the roles of the institutional actors
within it,”33 the J.D.B. court acknowledged what the research
supports: children and teenagers are particularly vulnerable
during custodial interrogations.34 And this country’s high

17. Id. at 440, 448–49, fn. 1, 9–10.
18. JOHN E. REID & ASSOCIATES, INC., http://www.reid.com/r_
about.html.
19. See FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS
(5th ed. 2013).
20. See Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Decision to Confess
Falsely: Rational Choice and Irrational Action, 74 DENV. U. L. REV.
979, 990 (1997).
21. Id. at 999.
22. Id. at 1108.
23. Corley v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1558, 1570 (2009).
24. Richard A. Leo & Steven A. Drizin, The Three Errors: Pathways to
False Confession and Wrongful Conviction, in POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND FALSE CONFESSIONS: CURRENT RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 9 (G. Daniel Lassiter & Christian Meissner eds., 2010).
25. Id.at 17–19.
26. Id. at 19–21.
27. 60 Minutes: Chicago: The False Confession Capital (CBS television
broadcast Dec. 9, 2012), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/
8301-18560_162-57557685/chicago-the-false-confession-capital/.
28. Critics Corner, JOHN E. REID & ASSOCIATES, INC.,

http://www.reid.com/educational_info/criticfalseconf.html.
29. See generally N. Dickon Reppucci, Jessica Meyer, & Jessica Kostelnik, Custodial Interrogation of Juveniles: Results of a National Survey of Police, in POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND FALSE CONFESSIONS:
CURRENT RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 67
(G. Daniel Lassiter & Christian A. Meissner eds. 2010).
30. See Northwestern Law, Bluhm Legal Clinic, Wrongful Convictions
of Youth, Spotlight (Sept. 11, 2013), http://www.law.northwest
ern.edu/legalclinic/wrongfulconvictionsyouth/news/spotlight/
index.html (highlighting the Tennessee cases of People v. Brendan
Barnes, People v. Carlos Campbell, and In re C.R. where these tactics were employed).
31. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005); Graham v.
Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68–70 (2010).
32. Graham, 560 U.S. at 77–79.
33. Id.
34. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011) (citing Brief for
Center on Wrongful Convictions of Youth et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner-Appellant 21–22 (collecting empirical studies that “illustrate the heightened risk of false confessions from
youth”)).
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Court is not alone in this conclusion: international treaties
such as Article 37 of the Convention on the Rights of the
Child—and a “significant
number of [other] relevant
international law materials”—
demand that all minors receive
legal assistance before interrogation while in police custody
because of an increased risk of
coerced or false confession.35 Given this backdrop, it is essential that judges carefully scrutinize all aspects of a juvenile’s
confession. The sections below outline some of the particular
issues for consideration.

“[A] judge’s ruling
on... pretrial
[suppression]
motions might
determine the
entire outcome
of the case.”

PRETRIAL SUPPRESSION ISSUES

When dealing with a case involving a confession from a
juvenile, judges may face a variety of arguments from the
defense as to why the confession should be kept from the jury.
Given the evidentiary power of confession evidence, a judge’s
ruling on these pretrial motions might determine the entire
outcome of the case. Indeed, one leading legal evidence treatise has remarked that “the introduction of a confession makes
the other aspects of a trial in court superfluous.”36 Examples
abound of innocent confessors being convicted even in light of
overwhelming evidence of innocence, such as seminal DNA
from a juvenile sexual assault and murder victim that excludes
the confessor.37
A confession must be suppressed where it is obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona or is otherwise involuntary. For a
statement to be admitted into evidence in compliance with
Miranda, a suspect must knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his rights to remain silent and to counsel when
subjected to a custodial interrogation.38 The voluntariness of a
confession is evaluated using a totality of the circumstances
test that considers both the individual vulnerabilities of the
suspect and law enforcement’s tactics in eliciting the confession.39 Each of these questions must be analyzed more rigorously when the confessor is a juvenile.
THE MIRANDA QUESTION: WHAT IS “CUSTODIAL
INTERROGATION”?
Sometimes, a law enforcement officer will elicit a confession
from a juvenile without ever giving Miranda warnings at all,
reasoning that the warnings were not required because the

35. Salduz v. Turkey, App. No. 36391/02,2 Eur. Ct. H.R., 2008, 32–36,
60 (2008) (discussing the recommendations of the Committee of
Ministers to Member States of the Council of Europe and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which require immediate
counsel for all minors taken into custody and before interrogation). The European Court of Human Rights is an international
court that hears cases alleging violations of the civil and political
rights set out in the European Convention on Human Rights by
states party to the treaty.
36. CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 316
(1983).
37. See e.g., People v. Rivera, 962 N.E.2d 53 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011); Peo-
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child was either not in custody or was not interrogated. The
custody inquiry asks courts to consider whether an objective
person would have felt free to leave under the circumstances.40
This custody question was at the forefront of J.D.B. In that
case, a 13-year-old seventh grader suspected of burglary was in
social studies class when an investigator arrived at the school
and informed administrators—including the assistant principal and a uniformed school resource officer—that he needed to
question the boy.41 The resource officer then went into the
social studies classroom and removed the student, taking him
into a closed-door room where he was met by the assistant
principal and the investigator.42 After some small talk, the
investigator, with aid from the assistant principal, questioned
the boy, leading him to confess to the burglaries.43 No Miranda
warnings were ever read.44
The admissibility of the schoolhouse confession became the
centerpiece of the litigation: three North Carolina courts
affirmed its admissibility by ruling that J.D.B. was not in custody at the time of the admissions while refusing to consider
the child’s age as part of the inquiry.45 The high Court, however, disagreed, reversing and ordering a reconsideration of the
custody determination to account for all relevant circumstances, including the suspect’s age.46
The import of a consideration of age in this custody calculus cannot be understated. The average young person likely
has no idea that he could ever, under any circumstances,
choose to terminate an encounter with a law enforcement officer. Kids are taught from birth to respect the authority of adults
and are punished when they don’t—even moreso when the
elder is a police officer. Unless he clearly understands his right
to do so, it is difficult to imagine any juvenile would ever comprehend that he could choose to simply ignore an officer’s
wishes to speak to him and unilaterally end the encounter.
After J.D.B., judges must rigorously question any admission obtained by police without Miranda warnings regardless
of where, when, or how it was obtained. Traditional questions
regarding whether the suspect was handcuffed, or whether an
adult concerned with the welfare of the child was present,
remain important but may be secondary to the simple fact that
the suspect is a kid. Any Miranda-less confession at a school
is clearly problematic after J.D.B., as such a child would have
to muster not only the wherewithal to withstand the investigator but also, in all likelihood, the orders of school administrators or resource officers to cooperate—all in an environment where students are prohibited from leaving their classroom unless they have an adult’s permission. Even police

ple v. Barr, No. 1-05-3505, 1-05-3699 Cons. (Ill. App. Ct. Aug. 28,
2007) (unpublished order).
38. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
39. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
40. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2402 (2011).
41. Id. at 2399.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 2400.
44. Id. at 2399.
45. Id. at 2400.
46. Id. at 2408.

questioning of a young person in the living room of his own
home, with his mother by his side, raises the question of
whether a reasonable child has the practical ability to say to
the officer: “I don’t want to answer your questions and would
like you to leave.”
The question of what constitutes an “interrogation” of a
juvenile suspect also deserves new attention after J.D.B. An
interrogation occurs when police should know that their
words or actions are likely to elicit an incriminating
response.47 Therefore, even if a suspect is in custody, any
Miranda-less confession he makes is admissible if it was not
made in response to an interrogation. Where an officer knows
he is dealing with a juvenile, the question becomes whether
words or actions that would not constitute an interrogation of
an adult suspect might when the person being questioned is a
juvenile.
This very question is at issue in the Michigan case of People
v. White.48 Seventeen-year-old armed-robbery suspect Kadeem
White was taken into custody and given his Miranda warnings.
He asserted his right to remain silent. Shortly thereafter, the
officer said: “Okay. The only thing I can tell you is this, and I’m
not asking you any questions, I’m just telling you. I hope that
the gun is in a place where nobody can get a hold of it and
nobody else can get hurt by it, okay. All right.” Kadeem
responded with a brief admission that the State successfully
sought to introduce into evidence.49
While a five-judge panel of the Michigan Supreme Court
affirmed the admissibility of the statement, it did so over the
vigorous dissent of two justices. Citing J.D.B. and other
authority, Justice Kelly argued that the investigator “should
have recognized that defendant’s age made him especially susceptible to subtle compulsive efforts and that such conduct
would likely elicit an incriminating response.”50 Justice
Cavanaugh explained that Kadeem’s youth and inexperience
increased the likelihood that he would feel compelled to
respect the officer and perceive the officer’s statements as
requiring a response.51
Other cases are likely to arise where judges will be asked to
consider claims by law enforcement that officers’ words or
actions that led to statements by juveniles were not “interrogations.” Whether the police words or actions took place without
Miranda warnings—or if they occurred after an invocation of
rights by the minor, as in White—J.D.B. suggests that there
may be a distinction regarding what constitutes an “interrogation” when the suspect is a child as opposed to an adult.

THE MIRANDA QUESTION:
“[T]here may be
WHAT IS A PROPER WAIVER
a distinction
OF MIRANDA RIGHTS?
The question of whether a regarding what
suspect knowingly, intelligently,
constitutes an
and voluntarily waives his
‘interrogation’
Miranda rights is a separate
inquiry that is governed by a
when the
“totality of the circumstances” suspect is a child
test that has long included conas opposed to
sideration of the suspect’s age.52
an adult.”
But after J.D.B.’s express concern
about the unique susceptibility
of youth during custodial interrogation, judges would be well
served to pay careful attention to the methods by which police
obtain waivers from juvenile suspects.
Three decades ago, in a renowned study, psychologist
Thomas Grisso concluded that the majority of juveniles under
15 simply did not understand at least one of their Miranda
rights even when properly read to them.53 Even with the
increased repetition of Miranda warnings on television shows
and in pop culture, more recent studies have replicated these
findings.54 And so-called “juvenile Miranda warnings,” which
law enforcement often claims are simpler, more kid-friendly
warnings that ensure a proper waiver, generally use language
that still requires at least an eighth-grade level of comprehension, far above the intelligence level of many young confessors.55
Consider the case of an 11-year-old Florida murder suspect,
who was administered Miranda warnings slowly and carefully
before his questioning and admission. Three experts, including
one retained by the State, all independently concluded that
despite these precautions, this boy simply could not understand his rights.56 Or consider the case of a 12-year-old honor
roll student in Arkansas, who initially signed a Miranda waiver
and made a confession even though he later made clear that he
had no idea what the word “waiver” meant. When the law
enforcement officer misinformed the boy of the word’s meaning, his confession was suppressed and the murder charges
eventually dropped.57 Even older juveniles, such as almost-17year-old Nga Truong, have given confessions that were later
suppressed despite properly read Miranda warnings when officers downplayed the rights’ significance.58
The lessons of these cases and the Grisso study is that for
certain juveniles, judges should consider starting with a pre-

47. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300–02 (1980).
48. People v. White, 828 N.W.2d 329 (Mich. 2013).
49. Id. at 331.
50. Id. at 354 (Kelly, J. dissenting).
51. Id. at 341–52 (Cavanaugh, J. dissenting).
52. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724–25 (1979).
53. Thomas Grisso, Juveniles’ Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An
Empirical Analysis, 68 CAL. L. REV. 1134 (1980).
54. See, e.g., Naomi Goldstein et al., Juvenile Offenders’ Miranda Rights
Comprehension and Self-Reported Likelihood of Offering False Confessions, 10 ASSESSMENT 359 (2003).
55. Richard Rogers et al., The Comprehensibility and Content of Juvenile

Miranda Warnings, 14 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 6387 (2008).
56. See Jim Schoettler, Defense Expert: Cristian Fernandez Unable to
Fully Comprehend or Interpret Miranda, FLA. TIMES-UNION, July 1,
2012, available at http://jacksonville.com/news/crime/2012-0629/story/defense-expert-cristian-fernandez-unable-fullycomprehend-or-interpret.
57. T.C. v. Arkansas, 364 S.W.3d 53 (Ark. 2010).
58. Commonwealth v. Truong, 28 Mass.L.Rptr. 223 (Sup. Ct. 2011).
See also David Boeri, Anatomy of a Bad Confession, BOSTON PUBLIC
RADIO WBUR (Dec. 7, 2011), available at http://www.wbur.org/
tags/worcester-coerced-confession (showing videos of the interrogation).
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sumption that the suspect could
not properly waive his rights.
Only with particularized expert
evaluations to the contrary, or
other evidentiary facts that suggest the child was either uniquely
able to understand his warnings
or that law enforcement officers
followed best practices and used
special precautions to guarantee
Miranda understanding, should
this presumption be rebutted.
Law enforcement best practices for Miranda have been recently modernized in a juvenile
interview and interrogation guide entitled Reducing Risks: An
Executive’s Guide to Effective Juvenile Interview and Interrogation, developed by the International Association of Chiefs of
Police (“IACP”) in conjunction with the Office of Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Adjudication and the authors of this
article.59 The guide advises officers to “read each warning
slowly, stopping to ask the child after each individual warning
to explain it back in his or her own words.” The guide also
offers proposed language for administering the rights,60
including a requirement to inform young suspects of the possible adult criminal consequences of the crime. Judges should
be concerned when officers stray from these guidelines, especially for younger juveniles or those without prior law
enforcement experience. However, even for those juveniles
who do have significant previous interactions with police,
judges should carefully consider what that experience
entailed. So, for example, if a juvenile had prior interactions
with police for minor offenses—and these interactions
resulted in a confession followed by a diversion out of the
court system—this experience may have actually taught the
child that a confession would only help secure his release and
would not, in fact, “be used against him,” despite what he may
have been told.
To that end, judges should take to heart a true “totality of
the circumstances” approach when it comes to juvenile
waivers. A body of case law is developing that demonstrates
the importance of considering the entirety of the interrogation, not just the admonitions and the waiver itself, when it
comes to this analysis. In Hart v. A.G.,61 for example, the interrogator “went to great lengths” to explain the Miranda warnings to the suspect; the confession was suppressed, however,

“[J]udges should
take to heart a
true ‘totality
of the
circumstances’
approach when
it comes to
juvenile
waivers.”

59. INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, REDUCING RISKS: AN EXECUTIVE’S
GUIDE TO EFFECTIVE JUVENILE INTERVIEW AND INTERROGATION
(2012).
60. The recommended language is as follows:
1. You have the right to remain silent. That means you do not
have to say anything.
2. Anything you say can be used against you in court.
3. You have the right to get help from a lawyer right now.
4. If you cannot pay a lawyer, we will get you one here for free.
5. You have the right to stop this interview at any time.
6. Do you want to talk to me?
7. Do you want to have a lawyer with you while you talk to me?
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when the interrogator later told the suspect that “honesty
wouldn’t hurt him,” which the court recognized was incompatible with Miranda. Other videotaped interrogations have
shown investigators telling a suspect that “he is going to talk”
immediately before reading warnings that were supposedly
meant to relay to the suspect he had a right not to talk.
The “kids are different” approach to custodial interrogation
also may call into question seemingly established U.S. Supreme
Court precedents like Davis v. U.S.62 and Berghuis v. Thompkins.63 Those cases require suspects to unambiguously invoke
their rights to silence or an attorney. Both cases, however,
involve adult suspects, and recent categorical statements about
juveniles made by the high Court referencing their “limited
understanding[] of the criminal justice system and the roles of
the institutional actors within it”—not to mention the obvious
fact that many youth simply do not speak in such a clear or
assertive manner—are incompatible with rules that require
kids to make steadfast, savvy demands for counsel. Therefore,
if a juvenile says almost nothing for hours on end before folding under questioning—like 17-year-old Jonathan Doody64
did—or makes an equivocal request for counsel, judges may be
forced to grapple with whether Davis or Thompkins still applies
to a young confessor in a post-J.D.B. “kids are different” world.
The same may hold true when a juvenile asks for and is denied
the guidance of a trusted adult like a parent during interrogation; Fare v. Michael C.,65 which held that a teenager’s request
to speak with his probation officer during interrogation was
not an invocation of Miranda, is now four decades old and
arguably obsolete in light of the high Court’s new juvenile
jurisprudence.
THE VOLUNTARINESS QUESTION: HOW TO CONSIDER
INDIVIDUAL VULNERABILITIES AND QUESTIONABLE
TACTICS WITH KIDS
Separate and apart from Miranda questions, if there is coercive police activity, due process requires the suppression of a
confession when the totality of circumstances, taking into
account the individual vulnerabilities of the suspect, renders
the confession involuntary.66 The recent juvenile jurisprudence
affects both the inquiry into individual vulnerabilities and
coercive police activity when it comes to young suspects.
As to the former, young age has always been considered a
vulnerability during interrogation, but the J.D.B. decision and
sentencing jurisprudence reinvigorates the fact that age is
more than a number. Even the four J.D.B. dissenters agreed

The officer should stop between each of the seven steps to assure
that the child can adequately explain back the admonition in his own
words. Id.
61. Hart v. A.G., 323 F.3d 884 (11th Cir. 2010).
62. Davis v. U.S., 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
63. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010) (applying North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979), which is also a case where the
suspect was an adult).
64. Doody v. Ryan, 649 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 2011).
65. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979)
66. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 165 (1986)

with the majority that all juveniles under 18 are “more susceptible to police pressure.”67 Indeed, so does law enforcement, including the proprietors of the Reid Technique: They
explain that juveniles are more suggestible and advise interrogators to exercise “extreme caution and care” when interrogating them.68 Judges should thus inquire as to what special
precautions officers took when questioning a youth. And it is
not adequate if the only special precautions taken amount to
securing the presence of a “youth officer” or obtaining
parental consent. Courts have recognized that a police officer
who is forced to alter roles and suddenly act in the best interest of a child as a “youth officer” may be no more help than a
“potted plant.”69 At the same time, scholars have persuasively
argued that the presence of even a well-meaning parent can
actually add to the coercive nature of the interrogation for a
child.70
The question of whether certain police tactics are acceptable
for adult suspects yet too coercive for a child is perhaps the
more robust inquiry. To this end, judges should look to the
International Association of Chiefs of Police best-practices
guide described earlier. This executive police manual provides
a detailed account of how (and how not) to question juvenile
suspects, with special attention given to ensuring that police
do not draw faulty conclusions from common adolescent
behaviors, limiting juvenile questioning sessions to an hour
during the daytime, advising police to use only open-ended
questions, and instructing interrogators to refrain from making
even indirect suggestions of “help” in exchange for a confession.71 When officers stray from these guideposts, judges
should question their tactics. Judges also should be open to
hearing from an expert on police interrogations of juveniles as
they consider the police tactics used and the ultimate voluntariness of the confession.
Additionally, judges should pay special attention to any use
of deception by police officers during an interrogation of a
youth. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has suggested (in a
case involving a 20-year-old Marine) that interrogators are not
prohibited from using deception on suspects during questioning72—and the Reid Technique also allows interrogators to lie
as a last resort—even Reid draws a line at using this tactic with
children.73 If evidence surfaces that police used deceptive tactics on the young suspect—whether it be false claims that
other witnesses have named him or even suggestions that the
consequences of confessing are less because of the suspect’s

youth—judges should pay
special heed and strongly
consider suppressing the
confession.

J.D.B’s assertion that the
risk of false confession is “all
the more acute” with a juvenile suspect is well based in
research. The Court relied on
a brief submitted by the authors of this article as part of our
work with the Center on Wrongful Convictions of Youth
(“CWCY”), wherein we pointed to a series of empirical and
laboratory studies that show juveniles falsely confess at a significantly greater rate than adults.74 These confessions, moreover, can be startlingly detailed. Nearly one-fifth of DNA exonerations, for example, include false confessions, and 95% of
those confessions included descriptive facts that seemingly
only the true perpetrator would know.75
Determining the reliability—or truth—of the actual confession in the context of bench trials should be done systematically and carefully.76 Judges should begin by closely examining
the confession itself to determine if it “fits” with the physical
evidence, other witness statements, and the State’s overall theory of the crime. Every detail, big and small, should be scrutinized. For instance, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
recently ordered a new trial for 16-year-old confessor Daniel
Villegas, in part because his confession named co-perpetrators
whose participation was impossible because they were in custody at the time of the crime.77 In other questionable confessions, however, even smaller details, such as the location in the
house of the crime, were inconsistent with the physical evidence. In these cases, when faced with adjudicating the truth
of the confession, judges must force themselves to come up
with adequate answers to tough questions before convicting—
questions like, why would a true confessor be unable to accurately relay facts about the crime scene? or, is there an adequate explanation as to why the suspect would truly confess to
a heinous crime yet lie about mundane details such as the
exact location of the offense?
After determining which facts do not “fit,” judges should
closely examine the accurate details. This process involves

67. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2413 (2011) (Alito, J.,
dissenting).
68. Critics Corner, supra note 28.
69. Hardaway v. Young, 302 F.3d 757, 765 (7th Cir. 2002).
70. See e.g., Hillary B. Farber, The Role of the Parent/Guardian in Juvenile Custodial Interrogations: Friend or Foe? 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1277 (2004).
71. INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, supra note 59.
72. Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739 (1969) (holding that telling a
suspect that another suspect had already confessed and implicated
him in the crime does not alone render a confession involuntary).
73. INBAU ET AL., supra note 19, at 255.
74. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2401 (2011) (citing Brief

for Center on Wrongful Convictions of Youth et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioner-Appellant 21–22).
75. BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT 20 (2011).
76. In a law review article, the authors provide a detailed explanation
as to how practitioners can examine and apply the fit and contamination analysis described below. See Laura H. Nirider, Joshua A.
Tepfer, & Steven A. Drizin, Combating Contamination in Confession
Cases, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 837, 849–61 (2012). The charts and
other suggested tactics outlined in this article could also be utilized by judges and their clerks when tasked with evaluating a
confession’s reliability.
77. Ex parte Villegas, ___ S.W.3d ___, No. WR-78260-01, 2013 WL
6636458 (Tex. Crim. App., Dec. 18, 2013).
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analyzing the confession for contamination—or the disclosure of
crime scene facts to the suspect
before the confession. A confession can be contaminated by
neighborhood gossip, or, in more
high-profile cases, through media
reports. A judge should consider
(and allow into evidence) what
information was in the public
domain; if the confession only
contains details already known to
the general public, the confession
may prove little. The same holds true for accurate details that
could be explained through innocent knowledge: a young confessor who was also the first person to come upon a dead body
and report it to police, for example, would be able to describe
the deceased’s clothes or body position even if he did not commit the murder.
By far the most common source of contamination, however,
comes from the interrogators themselves. During a pressurepacked interrogation, police investigators may unintentionally
reveal crime scene facts to the suspect, despite training not to
do so. The improper use of leading or forced choice questions
enables the suspect to infer the answers the interrogator is
seeking. A suspect’s confession may also be contaminated if the
interrogator shows a suspect crime scene photos or takes him
to the location of the crime.
Finding this source of contamination can be done accurately only when the interrogation is recorded in full. In such
a case, judges should examine the confession to determine if
the source of each detail truly and originally came from the
confessor or the interrogator.78 Some confessions literally
include no details that were not first proffered by the questioner, and appellate courts have placed the burden on the
State to prove a lack of contamination in order to uphold a
conviction based mostly on a confession.79 A highly contaminated confession is wholly unreliable.
When the interrogation is unrecorded, an accurate evaluation of the reliability of the confession is more difficult. At the
outset, however, given the national trend toward laws requiring
the electronic recording of custodial interrogations—a policy
recommended by the IACP and one that certainly benefits law
enforcement officers who are conducting legal and proper custodial interrogations80—it is fair for judges to have a heightened
level of suspicion when the technology to record was available
yet not utilized by police. Appellate judges, including Chief
Judge Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit, have articulated these suspicions when interrogations go unrecorded.81 Ultimately, the

failure to record the entire interrogation in such circumstances
should be given great weight in assessing both the admissibility
and reliability of the confession.82
But even without a recording, judges can examine the issue
of contamination by allowing into evidence police reports,
medical examinations, witness interviews, and any other information that reveals what details the police knew before the
interrogation and the source of those details. Such evidence is
not hearsay because it is not being offered for the truth of the
facts known to police, only as evidence that the police knew
this information before the interrogation. If the only accurate
details in the final confession were already known by law
enforcement, this is, at least, circumstantial evidence of contamination and an unreliable confession.
Finally, in assessing a confession’s reliability, judges should
give great weight when confessors lead the police to accurate
information or evidence that they did not know at the time of
the interrogation. This kind of corroboration—the name of an
accomplice, the location of the murder weapon or the bloody
clothes, the fruits of an armed robbery—is what the Reid Technique refers to as “independent corroboration”83 and is the
most convincing evidence that a confession is true.

78. See Nirider et al., supra note 76 at 849–61.
79. See e.g., People v. Rivera, 962 N.E.2d 53 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011).
80. INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, supra note 59.
81. See Milke v. Ryan, 711 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2013).
82. See, e.g., 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/103-2.1(b), (d), (f) (West
2013) (explaining that there is a presumption of inadmissibility of

a confession to certain offenses that was the result of an
unrecorded interrogation that can only be overcome by a finding
by the preponderance of the evidence that the statement was both
voluntary and reliable).
83. INBAU ET AL., supra note 19, at 355.
84. GARRETT, supra note 75, at 36–40.
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CONCLUSION

It can often be very difficult even for experienced and skeptical judges to recognize when a confession is problematic. In
his study of the first 40 proven false-confession cases amongst
those in which defendants were later exonerated by DNA evidence, Professor Brandon Garrett found that in virtually every
case, judges denied defendants’ pretrial motions to suppress,
decisions which were then upheld by appellate courts.84 After
all, it is hard for even judges to imagine that anyone would
confess to a serious crime they did not commit. But the evidence continues to grow that false confessions happen with a
level of frequency—especially in cases involving teenagers and
children—that demands close scrutiny from our judicial system. It is the hope of the authors that this article will guide
judges in their efforts to scrutinize such cases, ultimately
ensuring both that juvenile confessions were lawfully obtained
and that they are reliable evidence of guilt.
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